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Zusammenfassung
Griechisch-Thrakien – eine von Christen und Muslimen bewohnte Region im europäischen Mittelmeerraum
Seit dem Vordringen der Osmanen auf europäisches Territorium im 14. Jahrhundert konnte sich im Südosten des Kontinents eine islamisch 
geprägte Bevölkerung etablieren, die über Jahrhunderte diesen Raum prägten. Erst seit der Gründung überwiegend christlich ausgerichteter 
Nationalstaaten auf dem Balkan seit dem 19. Jahrhundert wurden die islamischen Bevölkerungsgruppen mit ethnisch-türkischer Ausrichtung 
zu  Minderheiten, deren Beziehungen zu den mehrheitlich christlich geprägten Nominalvölkern aufgrund regionaler historischer Entwick-
lungen oftmals schwierig sind. Die Muslime in Griechisch-Thrakien, vom Bevölkerungsaustausch zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei 
1923 ausgenommen, blieben in den folgenden Jahrzehnten dabei immer politischer Spielball Griechenlands und der Türkei. Die Betonung des 
Türkischen in der Minderheit erweckte bei den Griechen immer wieder das Bild der Minderheit als fünfte Kolonne der Türkei, was besonders 
während der Militärdiktatur (1967-1974) und darüber hinaus zu Einschränkungen der Minderheitenrechte führte.  Nach dieser Phase der 
Repressionen gelang es der Minderheit sich in der Weltöffentlichkeit Gehör zu verschaffen und mithilfe internationaler Organisation wie der 
EU, Griechenland zum Überdenken seiner Minderheitenpolitik zu bewegen. Der Prozess der Gleichstellung von Christen und Muslimen in 
Thrakien ist jedoch noch nicht abgeschlossen. Das christlich-muslimische Thrakien zeigt, welche spezifischen Beziehungsmuster sich in einer 
gemischtreligiösen Bevölkerung entwickeln können, die sich in charakteristischer Weise von monoreligiösen oder geschlossenen Gemein-
schaften abheben. Somit lässt sich die indigene muslimische Bevölkerung in Thrakien nicht mit  westeuropäischen Migrantengesellschaften 
vergleichen, allein, weil die thrakischen Muslime wie ihre christlichen Mitbürger die Region als ihre Heimat empfinden und somit ein anderes 
Selbstverständnis ausbilden konnten als z.B. muslimische Migranten in Westeuropa.  
Muslime,  Christen „Vertrag von Lausanne“, Bevölkerungsaustausch, Griechen, Türken, gemischtreligiös, Sadık Ahmet, Griechisch-Thrak-
ien
Abstract
After the Ottomans advanced into European territory in the 14th century, an Islamic population was able to establish itself in the south-east of 
the continent and shaped the region for centuries. It was not until the largely Christian national states were established in the Balkans as of the 
19th century that the Islamic population groups with Turkish ethnicity became minorities whose relationships with the Christian majority are 
often difficult owing to historical regional developments. The Muslims in Greek Thrace remained a political football for Greece and Turkey in 
the decades that followed, with the exception of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The emphasis on Turkish in the 
minority repeatedly revived the image of the minority as fifth columnists for Turkey among the Greeks, which resulted in curtailments of the 
minority’s rights, particularly during the military dictatorship (1967-1974) and beyond. After this phase of repression, the minority succeeded 
in gaining an audience in the world’s public and getting Greece to rethink its minority policy with the help of international organisations and 
the EU. However, the process of achieving equal treatment for Christians and Muslims in Thrace is not finished yet. Christian-Muslim Thrace 
shows the specific relationship patterns that can develop in a mixed-religion population, which have different characteristics from mono-reli-
gious or closed communities. This means that the indigenous Muslim population in Thrace cannot be compared to Western European migrant 
societies because both the Muslims in Thrace and their Christian compatriots see the region as their homeland and have therefore been able to 
develop a different identity from that of Muslim migrants in Western Europe, for example.  
Muslims, Christians, Treaty of Lausanne, population exchange, Greeks, Turks, mixed religion, Sadık Ahmet, Greek Thrace
Greek Thrace – a region populated by Christians and Mus-
lims in the European Mediterranean
Hermann Kandler
Christian and Muslim populations 
in the Balkans
In a speech on 10 February 2008, Turk-
ish prime minister Erdoğan called for 
the Turks living in Western Europe not 
to become assimilated. It is statements 
like this that keep discussions on how 
to integrate Muslims into our occiden-
tal Christian society alive. Integration 
is needed to prevent the pillarisation of 
society and all its consequences, in other 
words, more or less closed communi-
ties living alongside each other. This is 
more pronounced in the Netherlands, for 
instance, where the term “pillarisation” 
was coined to describe the social segre-
gation.
However, the question is whether dis-
cussions on integration can be held in a 
place where indigenous populations with 
different cultural and religious charac-
ters have grown into a region together, 
perceive and claim it as home and thus 
do not wish for integration in the above 
sense. It is only to be expected that the 
understanding of cultural and religious 
diversity, which has formed there over 
time, differs from that in Western Euro-
pean immigrant societies.
South East Europe, in particular, of-
fers up a whole range of different forms 
of Christian and Muslim coexistence, 
the latest case being Kosovo. Although 
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Muslims and Christians – the his-
torical development of the minor-
ity situation in Greek Thrace
The case study of Thrace in the north-
east of Greece (Fig. 1) features histori-
cal and geographical singularities, which 
have led to the formation of a society that 
differs enormously from developments 
in other countries. As elsewhere in the 
Balkans, the society was based on the 
organisation of the Ottoman state and, 
more specifically, on its millet system. 
This state organisational form was based 
on the guarantee of considerable au-
tonomy for individual “national” (millet 
= Turkish for “population”) or ethnic or 
religious groups in the Ottoman Empire. 
Apart from their declaration of loyalty, 
they were often bound to the Sublime 
Porte in Istanbul by taxes alone. The state 
thus stood out from other state structures 
of the time in terms of tolerance, al-
though it differed from modern, pluralis-
tic social systems in many respects. The 
foundations of an indigenous European 
Islam were laid when the Ottomans con-
quered Thrace in the 14th century.
In urban areas in particular, the per-
centage of Turkish Muslims was very 
high during the consolidation phase of 
the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. 
The number in the provincial capital of 
Gümülcine (Komotini) is estimated at 
87 % (DeDe 1975, p. 27). Greek sources 
contradict this, quoting the traveller Be-
lon du Mans (1546), who claimed that 
“Greeks and a few(!) Turks lived” in the 
city in the 16th century (KanDler 2007, p. 
11). The population estimates are popu-
larly used to prove one particular group’s 
natural, historical right to live in Thrace 
or to contradict the opposing view.
The Ottoman reform policy of the 19th 
century (Tanzimat) granted non-Mus-
lims further freedoms. In the prospering 
economic sectors, in particular, they took 
over a leading role: In 1912, for instance, 
the Komotini bank and trading company 
comprised 33 Greeks, six Armenians, 
four Jews and only three Turks (liapis 
1993, p. 24). This unequal participation 
of the population groups in socially high-
ly regarded professions is still noticeable 
today in the economic structure of Thra-
ce. After Thrace was assigned its current 
borders in the peace treaties of Istanbul 
and Bucharest (1913), a separate Western 
Thrace state was formed in the border-
lands of today’s Greek Thrace (Fig. 1). 
Although it barely existed two months, 
it was seen as the first Turkish republic 
and is highly valued in the historical 
consciousness, not just of the Turkish 
Muslim population in Thrace, but also in 
Turkey (DeDe 1975, p. 48). The 10 years 
that followed, however, showed that this 
Thrace at the intersection of Greece, 
Bulgaria and the declining Ottoman Em-
pire had no chance to develop as an indi-
vidual state.
The population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey (Lausanne 14/7/1923) 
meant a significant break for Thrace.
According to Article 2 of Appendix A 
of the convention signed by the Grand Na-
tional Assembly of Turkey and the Greek 
government on 30 January, the “compul-
sory exchange of Turkish nationals of the 
Greek Orthodox religion established in 
Turkish territory and Greek nationals of 
the Muslim religion established in Greek 
territory” (Art. 1) does not include:
a) “The Greek inhabitants of Constanti-
nople and
b) The Muslim inhabitants of Western 
Thrace” (quotation from Whitman 
1990, p. 45), the region of Thrace, 
which was separated from the Turkish 
part of Thrace by the still unchanged 
frontier of the Evros/Meriç riverbed 
ever since the Lausanne Treaty (Dale-
gre 1994, p. 134).
The terms “Greek” and “Muslim” (but 
not Turkish) still provoke discussions 
about the legality of the use of the na-
tional ethnic name of “Turkish” in of-
ficialdom today (e.g. German newspa-
per FAZ 28/3/2008). At the time of the 
treaty, however, there was no differentia-
tion made between national and religious 
designations.  “Rum” means “Greek 
Orthodox members” in Turkish while, 
although “Muslim” refers to the faith, 
from the foreign viewpoint of the Greek 
Christians it naturally meant the Turks 
(aarbakke 2000, p. 48). “Greeks” were 
Christians. “Muslim” was a common 
synonym for Turk from the viewpoint of 
the Christians in the Balkans. However, 
the choice of name did not meet with any 
opposition back then. After all, every-
body knew who was meant, there was no 
Turkish national feeling in Thrace at that 
time and the new Turkish state preferred 
the term “Muslims”, partly to distance 
themselves from the Ottoman clerics 
living in Thrace (e.g. the group of “150” 
scheming against Atatürk) (panagiotiDis 
1995, p. 148).
These stipulations meant that the Mus-
lim minority developed differently from 
other minority groups in the Balkans. 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
on 16 February 2008 is contested inter-
nationally and is only being recognised 
step by step, it was the only chance to 
avoid a further escalation of the conflict 
between the Serbs and Albanians, since 
Serbia was not prepared to grant minor-
ity rights to the Albanians in its autono-
mous republic. The historically-founded 
claim to Kosovo on both sides – it was 
settled by Albanians and is seen as the 
home of Serbian nationalism by the 
Serbs – prevented any idea of peaceful 
coexistence. ahtisaari’s report stresses 
that: “A history of enmity and mistrust 
has long antagonised the relationship 
between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs” 
(ahtisaari 2007, p. 80). Now the ques-
tion is whether the new state of Kosovo 
will find ways of integrating the Serbian 
minority.
And although Bosnia and Herze-
govina is well on the way to becoming 
a modern, democratic state, it cannot 
be described as nation-building. Inte-
gration is not an issue in its society. In-
stead, the state consists of a three-fold 
religious and ethnic structure, with the 
Croats generally linked to Catholicism, 
the Serbs to Orthodoxy and the Bos-
nians to “Muslims in an ethnic sense” 
(steinDorff 2007, p. 108). The social 
principle of integration has never had 
a tradition in Bosnia either. During the 
Ottoman era, “the groups lived side 
by side in an organised manner with 
boundaries that were never questioned” 
(steinDorff 2007, p. 105).
Albania could be taken as a successful 
example of integration with its Muslim 
majority (70 %) and Christian minor-
ity. But in this case too it is debatable 
whether integration strategies were 
ever or ever had to be implemented. 
Since the beginning of the Ottoman 
era, syncretism has been common in 
the Balkans (schmiDt 2007, p. 96), 
particularly in Albania. This was re-
flected in the creed of early Albanian 
nationalism as well – “The Albanians’ 
religion is Albanianism!” – and was 
consistently championed in the Stalin-
ist-led Albania of Enver Hoxha where 
any religious or cultural deviation was 
nipped in the bud (cela 1997, p. 141). 
Thus, integration is not necessarily an 
issue in Albania.
The Balkan states with a Christian-Is-
lamic society could be regarded as the 
“clashing civilisations” of huntington’s 
cultural fault lines (1997, p. 331).
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Although the minority enjoyed special 
privileges with their rights as Greek na-
tionals, their situation was always closely 
bound up in Greco-Turkish relations as a 
counterbalance to the Greeks remaining 
in Istanbul and on the islands. And when 
the Greek minority in Turkey dwindled 
to almost nothing, Thrace became a 
third bone of contention between Ath-
ens and Ankara, along with Cyprus and 
the Aegean question, although all three 
problem areas were interlinked. The un-
rest in Cyprus as of the 1950s therefore 
had a negative impact on the treatment 
of the minorities in Turkey and Greece 
as well.
As long as the minority saw itself as 
Muslim, the Greek state granted them 
rights and supported them as a religious 
minority “which lived side by side the 
Greeks with little integration …” (aar-
bakke 2000, p. 48). Since the minority 
found it difficult to identify themselves 
with the secular mother country of Tur-
key, their community became increas-
ingly pillarised within the Greek state. 
“The traditional attitudes connected to 
the Ottoman model of closed commu-
nities did not dispose people towards 
integration, and the stereotypes each 
community (Christians and Muslims 
[author’s note]) held of each other would 
help to preserve the differences” (aar-
bakke 2000, p. 48).
Greek Thrace faced its first crucial 
test shortly after the Treaty of Lausanne 
was ratified when the Greek government 
seized accommodation and land for the 
refugees who had come to Thrace before 
1923 and for Greeks evacuated from Asia 
Minor. This phase meant a considerable 
redistribution of agricultural property. 
Between 1923 and 1924, 8,245 rooms in 
the countryside and 5,590 in urban areas 
belonging to Muslims were seized for the 
new citizens. Mosques and schools were 
also used as emergency accommodation. 
Although these measures also affected 
local Christians, the refugees trauma-
tised by the war in Asia Minor saw the 
local Muslims as ethnic relatives of the 
hated Turkish Turks and treated them 
as such. Local Muslims were ordered 
to give parts of their homes to the refu-
gees – without any consideration for the 
women’s privacy – even though there 
were Greek-owned properties available. 
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Fig. 1: Greek Thrace
Source: own design
78 Europa Regional 15(2007)2
This meant that in some instances two 
families had to live in one room. Locals 
who refused were beaten and driven 
away (DeDe 1978, p. 212). Livestock and 
harvests were distributed among the new 
arrivals, along with the land, and the 
Muslims were generally left with noth-
ing. In some cases, local families had to 
provide for the refugees and the animals 
they brought with them (DeDe 1978, p. 
214). Although these developments were 
doubtlessly not planned, they were toler-
ated by the authorities, something that 
still rankles in the memories of the mi-
nority today.
The flood of around 110,000 immi-
grants continued until 1928 (Tab. 1). The 
change in the ratio of Greeks to Turks 
also forced the economic dominance of 
the Christians, which was already no-
ticeable during the Ottoman era and was 
ultimately reflected in the social struc-
ture as well. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the new population structure 
was used as a political tool. The “fresh 
blood from Anatolia” was supposed to 
increase the homogeneity of the popula-
tion in the north of Greece, in particular, 
and to strengthen “notions of national 
unity” there as well (Ginarakis, quo-
tation from R. 1930, p. 404). The area 
was to be deliberately Graecised by ex-
panding industry and settlements. The 
rebuilding of Thrace thus consisted of 
the establishment of tobacco factories 
in Kavala, Drama, Xanthi and Komotini 
(DeDe 1978, p. 93). The necessary funds 
were raised by taxes, which brought 
suffering to the Muslims affected by 
the seizures and dispossessions in par-
ticular. The outward appearance of the 
Thracian towns changed just as that of 
the rural areas did. The provision of 20 
million drachmae enabled 20,000 set-
tlers – mainly from Eastern Thrace – to 
settle on land taken from “Greek Muslim 
citizens” (Schultze 1935, p. 174). During 
this phase, towns and villages alike were 
expanded with colonist settlements and 
new settlements were founded. Very few 
new settlements were built in the yaka, 
the “lower slopes of the mountains”, in 
other words, the piedmont zone of the 
Rhodope Massif in the traditional tobac-
co-growing area, where the resident pop-
ulation “made full use of their right to 
remain in the country” (Schultze 1935, 
p. 175). However, there was a planned in-
terior colonisation in the former marsh-
land and steppe of the orta kışla (Turk-
ish for “middle winter camp”), in other 
words, the former winter pastures of the 
mountain nomads between the coast and 
the mountains (planhol). The new set-
tlements were often built between two 
Muslim villages, which became influ-
enced by them over time. This tactical 
Graecising was also documented in the 
changed place names. After 1923, Otto-
man place names were changed to or back 
to Greek names (e.g. Gümülcine became 
Komotini and Sapçı Sappes), places were 
renamed at will (Sendelli became Dymi) 
or were named after the home communi-
ties of the immigrants from Asia Minor 
(Fanari from Fanari/Fener in Istanbul) 
or given the adjective “new” (Nea Zanta 
from Zanta near Rize).
The fact that the new settlements were 
meant to force the old communities into 
the background politically still remains 
in the collective memory of the minor-
ity. This became an issue again in 1995 
when the arrival of 50,000 Pontic Greek 
Orthodox refugees (Ileri 5/1/1996, p. 1) 
from the war-torn areas of the Caucasus 
was announced. Ultimately, far fewer 
refugees actually settled in Thrace, part-
ly because many went to try their luck in 
the central areas of Greece or abroad.
The settlement issue was initially re-
solved, up until the 1950s. The minority 
even benefited from their loyalty during 
the Greek civil war (1944-1949) on the 
side of monarchist Greece. As a result, 
Greece granted them guaranteed free-
dom of religion and free self-designation 
as “Turks”. Turkish-speaking grammar 
schools were opened, for instance, which 
is why many minority citizens still talk 
of the “golden ’50s” today. This fact is 
important to note because Greece’s be-
haviour towards the minority changed. 
The reasons for this lay in a combina-
tion of the Enosis revolt in Cyprus and 
the expulsion of the Greek minority from 
Istanbul in 1955 and 1964 and from the 
Aegean islands of Tenedos and Imbros. 
Greece began to view the minority as 
not merely being of a different faith, but 
as potential placeholders for Turkey on 
Greek soil. The minority, in turn, became 
aware of the potential revanchism of the 
Christians or Greeks, causing many to 
strengthen their Turkey-orientated atti-
tudes, which led to the beginnings of ne-
glect and discrimination (Dalegre 1991, 
p. 51).
This neglect was one of the reasons for 
the ever greater emphasis on the Turkish 
aspect of the minority and the associated 
turning to Turkey the antagonist. Back 
in 1959, Yiannis Kapsis warned of a “fa-
natical group of Turks who were striving 
for autonomy” (aarbakke 2000, p. 138). 
But it was not until the time of the Greek 
junta that it became clear in which areas 
the minority were disadvantaged.
Due to neglected education, in partic-
ular, the minority fell behind the Chris-
tian majority. The education protocol 
from 1968 specified that lessons were to 
be taught in the pupils’ native language, 
with the exception of a few subjects 
(history, geography and citizenship). 
However, because second-rate teach-
ers were appointed, most of whom had 
been educated in Turkey, the required 
standard of teaching could no longer be 
guaranteed. Clauses in the bilateral pro-
tocols on education from 1952 and 1968, 
which granted the authorities the right 
to control and veto the introduction of 
books, meant that the Turkish textbooks 
from Turkey that were still available in 
1955 were copied many times over. In 
the 1990s, it was discovered with bitter-
ness that pupils were learning that “peo-
ple walk” (Ileri 26/5/1995a, p. 4). As a 
Ethnic group Population Increase/
Decrease
1912 1924
absolute % absolute % %
Greeks 87,000 36.7 189,000 62.2 117.2
Turks 111,000 46.8 84,000 27.6 -24.3
Bulgarians 35,000 14.7 23,000 7.6 -34.3
Other groups 4,000 1.8 8,000 2.6 44.4
Total 237,000 100.0 304,000 100.0
Western Thrace
Population development from 1912 to 1924 
Tab. 1: Population development in Western Thrace from 1912 to 1924 
Source: acc. to Schultze 1935, p. 173
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result, the percentage of pupils from the 
minority with high school-leaving quali-
fications is still significantly lower today 
than that of their contemporaries from 
the majority, as shown by a survey in a 
mixed-religion quarter of Komotini (Fig. 
2). New teaching syllabuses are only 
taking hold there slowly, partly because 
the Greek education policy is in need of 
a general overhaul (Apogevmatini tis 
Kyriakis, 13/12/1998, p. 4), which, in 
turn, has a particularly strong impact on 
economically underdeveloped areas such 
as Thrace. The number of school leavers 
completing secondary school was below 
average throughout the economic region 
of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, par-
ticularly in Nomos Rodopi (Rhodope 
Prefecture). There, the average was 27 
graduates per 1,000 inhabitants – the av-
erage for Greece as a whole was 39 per 
1,000 inhabitants (lienau & katsaros 
2004, p. 26).
The fact that Frangoudaki (University 
of Athens), who was in charge of a new 
education syllabus, and Stavropoulos, 
prefect of Rhodope at the time, spoke 
frankly about the weaknesses in minor-
ity education for the first time in 2002 
shows that the country is now becoming 
aware of the responsibility. The minority 
also acknowledges this. But in a dispute 
over school books, they also criticise the 
fact that Athens is refusing to approve 
the textbook “Our Turkish(sic!) Book” 
(Türkçe kıtabımız), partly because of 
the simple reason that the title contains 
the word “Turkish”. At the same time, 
the minority’s representatives make it 
clear that they are against the importing 
of school literature from Turkey because 
the topics are not suitable for Western 
Thracian primary schools – which is 
why they favour the publication of their 
own books: “We are people of the same 
country (“vatan” = Turkish for “state”, in 
other words, Greece) and share the same 
destiny. We love our country as much as 
anyone”, hence the majority should not 
regard the minority as a threat (ABTTF 
= Avrupa Batı Trakya Türk Federasyonu 
= Federation of Western Thrace Turks in 
Europe 14/4/2008). These words conceal 
a trusting attitude, which would have 
been hard to imagine 20 years before 
when the minority felt it “offensive” to 
be addressed as “Greek citizens” (Ileri 
10/5/1996, p. 1). At the beginning of the 
1980s, one decade after Greece’s return 
to democracy and at the time of the coun-
try’s entry into the EU (1984), the minor-
ity politician Sadık Ahmet (1947-1995) 
first spoke openly about the violations 
against the granted minority right, as 
well as the rejection of the self-designa-
tion “Turk”, the expatriation of Thracian 
Muslims and discrimination in day-to-
day life. He also started discussions on 
the appointing of muftis by the Greek 
government and the legal status of reli-
gious foundations (kanDler 1998, pp. 
28-31, aarbakke 2000, pp. 359ff.). It is 
thanks to Sadık Ahmet that the difficult 
situation of the minority population was 
made public outside Greece and Turkey.
The official name of the minority was 
always dependent on Athens’ political 
stance regarding Turkey. Whereas the 
government demanded that official in-
stitutions of the minority be designated 
“Turkish” and not “Muslim” in 1954, it 
has been opposing the use of the term 
“Turkish” since 1967. Athens’ disregard 
for the minority – also fuelled by Turkey 
– caused the conscious feeling of other-
ness to be strengthened to such a degree 
that initial attempts by Greece to help the 
minority were brusquely rejected by their 
representatives. “If they won’t let us call 
ourselves Turks, they are denying us our 
origins. We are loyal citizens of Greece, 
but we are Turks and demand the right 
to call ourselves Turks” (quotation from 
Whitman 1990, p. 15). The population is 
clearly turning to Turkey, the motherland 
(anavatan): “Those who say that Turk-
ishness in Western Thrace is not related 
to Turkishness in Turkey have hostile in-
tentions” (Ileri 1/12/95, p. 4).
Now, both the terms “Turk” and 
“Muslim” are used as synonyms in eve-
ryday life. But it was not until 2007 and 
2008 that the European Court of Hu-
man Rights ruled that the minority had 
the right to use the adjective “Türk” 
(Turkish) when naming their organisa-
tions (e.g. İskeçe Türk Birliği = Turkish 
Union of Xanthi), abolishing a decree 
of the Greek Court from 1996 (ABTTF 
27/3/2008, German newspaper FAZ, see 
above). In light of the fact that the mi-
nority does not form an ethnic entity, but 
is ethnically divided into “Muslims, Po-
maks and Roma” (Whitman 1990, p. 2), 
the Turkish language, which is spoken 
by all, is the bond uniting the different 
ethnic groups. However, the question re-
mains as to whether the victory in Stras-
bourg actually constituted progress in 
improving the minority’s quality of life 
or whether it was merely a victory of po-
litical prestige, in the face of the minor-
ity’s cultural diversity.
The revoking of Greek nationality, in 
accordance with Article 19 of the Greek 
Constitution, is a far more serious mat-
ter. During the junta era in particular 
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(1967-1974), “a person of non-Greek 
ethnic origin leaving Greece without the 
intention of returning may be declared 
as having lost Greek citizenship” (no. 
3370/1955, Chapter B, Section VI, Art. 
19 “Citizenship Code”), which could, of 
course, be applied easily to Greek citi-
zens with Turkish Muslim origins. The 
semi-official justification for the expatri-
ation was that these citizens were work-
ing against Greece – difficult to believe 
in the case of minor children (Aarbakke 
2000, p. 583). In 2005, the Greek parlia-
ment allegedly confirmed that 46,638 
Muslims had been stripped of their na-
tionality before Article 19 was repealed 
in 1998 (ABTTF 27/5/2005). I saw for 
myself that Muslims from Greek Thrace 
had difficulties entering the country that 
year, which shows that the abolition of 
the law did not immediately mean repa-
triation for those affected. Since 2006, 
ABTTF has provided a form in the Turk-
ish section of its website for those who 
lost their citizenship because of Article 
19. The organisation passes the forms on 
to the European Court of Human Rights 
(www.abttf.org 1/1/2008). On 16/6/2007, 
the application by expatriates affected by 
Article 19, which was rescinded in 1998, 
to be repatriated was accepted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (ABTTF 18/5/2007).
Obstacles to private development 
(acquiring land, building houses, public 
sector employment, acquiring driving 
licences, loans and credit, Ahmet 1989, 
pp. 39-44) from the authorities were also 
the order of the day well into the 1990s. 
“Cultural bureaus” – in reality, branches 
of the Foreign Office in the prefecture 
capitals – brought this out of the back-
ground.
On the other hand, the Greek state’s in-
tervention in religious matters of the Mus-
lim community includes complex prob-
lems, such as the legality of the appoint-
ing of muftis by the Greek government 
or the controlling of minority religious 
foundations. These were once treated in-
ternationally as violations too but, from 
today’s viewpoint, cannot necessarily 
be regarded as deliberate discrimination 
(Aarbakke 2000, pp. 359ff.).
In this area, in particular, it is becom-
ing clear how Turkey exploited the situa-
tion in Thrace for its foreign policy ma-
noeuvres. After all, it was Turkey with 
its strict, secular stance that refused all 
contact with the muftis until the issues 
became part of the minority protest in 
the 1980s thanks to minority politician 
Sadık Ahmet (aarbakke 2000, p. 357), 
and Turkey tried to instrumentalise the 
minority as a “co-national spearhead” 
(SeeWann 1995, p. 8). This, in turn, ex-
cited fears among the Greek population. 
Many Christians were all ready to “get 
over the Nestos (western border of Thra-
ce) in time” if Turkey were to invade.
In 1988 and 1990, violent clashes ac-
tually occurred. Protest marches by the 
Muslim minority and a lawsuit against 
Sadık Ahmet resulted in militant Greek 
nationalists attacking shops owned by 
Muslim citizens. The US State Depart-
ment therefore judged Thrace to be one 
of the future hot spots of the 21st century 
(KanDler 2007, p. 10). This unrest was 
also a wake-up call for Greece. This, 
along with pressure from the interna-
tional public, the decline of the political 
overreaction after Sadık’s death and the 
appeasement policy between Greece and 
Turkey – especially following the earth-
quake diplomacy of the two former for-
eign ministers Georgios Papandreou and 
Ismail Cem as of 1999 – enabled Greek 
politics to turn gradually to its Muslim 
minority (kanDler 2000, pp. 286ff., 
aarbakke 2000, p. 680). Thrace is no 
longer a bone of contention between 
Greece and Turkey.
Geographical aspects of the 
mixed-religion region of Thrace 
The changes in minority policy in Greece, 
which have been taking place for some 
15 years now, are of course only slowly 
becoming reflected in the structure of 
Greek Thracian society. However, this 
is not only because the process of gain-
ing trust and the growing together of two 
population groups takes time, at least at 
an official level, but also because the re-
gion itself has to fight general economic 
underdevelopment as well as the problem 
of bi-communality.
As part of the economic region of 
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Thrace 
belongs to the Greek peripheries and, as 
such, has deficits in development com-
pared to the central regions. The percent-
age of people in primary employment 
was the highest of all the economic re-
gions of Greece in 2001 (17 %: Greece as 
a whole 8 %) and the percentage of those 
in the tertiary sector was one of the low-
est (56 %: Greece as a whole 69 %). Only 
the secondary sector was above average 
(27 %: Greece as a whole: 23 %) due to 
recent efforts at a selective establishment 
of companies (Kavala, Komotini, Xanthi 
and Alexandroupolis) (Tab. 2). But all the 
economic sectors have characteristics of 
the peripheries: Agriculture is character-
ised by smallholdings and fragmented 
ownership as well as inefficiency and 
obsolete production methods. Trade and 
industry show below-average company 
sizes, insufficient and sometimes obso-
lete facilities and below-average labour 
productivity.
Labour-intensive agricultural sectors 
(such as tobacco growing) and industry 
(food and beverage) dominate the re-
gion’s economy and are characterised by 
a largely unskilled workforce. Rhodope 
Prefecture (Nomos Rodopi), home to the 
two settlements looked at below, shows 
the greatest deficits in development by 
far, even compared to the other prefec-
tures. This economic underdevelopment 
is clearly reflected in the population 
growth, which showed a slight plus in 
Xanthi, in the west of the region, but was 
negative in the Turkish-Bulgarian border 
area (for 1981-1994, Dalegre 1994, p. 
141).
Thracian cultural zones taking 
Rhodope Prefecture as a case study
In the 19th century, an occupation with 
mountainous settlement areas gave rise 
to the view that specific natural condi-
tions limit the living space of a popula-
tion (Ratzel, quotation from Brunnbauer 
2007, p. 17) and thus determine their cul-
tural way of life. This geographical deter-
minism was put into perspective by pos-
sibilism, according to which the environ-
ment sets constraints on people, but can 
also enable a wide range of possibilities 
in the area concerned (Brunnbauer 2007, 
p. 18). This can be seen in the western 
part of Greek Thrace (Xanthi and Rho-
dope) where many distinct similarities 
can be identified between clearly classi-
fiable geographical areas and a specific 
cultural form. This is so marked that it 
Thrace
Employment structure 2004
Prefecture
I. II. III.
Rodopi 49.6 15.4 35.0
Xanthi 28.4 26.7 44.9
Evros 27.6 16.9 55.6
Economic Sector (%)
Tab. 2: Employment structure in Thrace 
Source: acc. to lienau & Katsaros 2004, pp. 22-24
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can almost be described as typing of the 
respective population group (Fig. 3). In 
an epic poem, for instance, the Muslims 
from Thrace are separated into “inhab-
itants of the mountains, yaka (summer 
pastures) and ova” with an awareness of 
the differing ethnicity (Ileri 19/1/1996, 
p. 2). And although the minority want to 
appear as one entity to the outside world, 
they are aware of internal differentia-
tion into Pomaks in the mountains, the 
traditionally well-regarded Osmanlıs of 
the yaka, and the “modern” Turks in the 
towns and ova (Ileri 13/6/1997).
The figure shows the distribution of 
mono-religious and mixed-religion com-
munities, which noticeably match the 
geographical zones: mountains, balkana 
(I = the Rhodopes), the yaka (II = lower 
slopes of the mountains) and the ova or 
orta kışla (III). It covers the marshland 
and steppe, which were improved for and 
later by the Greek refugees from the 1920s 
onwards. Their settlements were often 
built right next-door to existing Muslim 
settlements. These generally straggling, 
planned settlements differ greatly from 
the traditional, mostly pure Muslim nu-
cleated villages of the lower mountain 
zone (yaka) in terms of physiognomy, 
but also with respect to the cultural and 
social structure of their populations. Two 
communities, Dymi (yaka) and Pagouria 
(orta kışla), are compared below as case 
studies. These represent distinctly oppo-
site types of Thracian settlements, which 
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is why there are no examples from the 
other two zones – the Rhodopes and the 
coast – at this point.
   
Dymi
Dymi (see Fig. 3) is a nucleated Muslim 
village. Traditional building methods 
predominate, with courtyards protected 
from sight by high walls. Like the other 
yaka villages, Dymi stands on an alluvi-
al fan at the discharge point of a seasonal 
watercourse right at the beginning of the 
foothills. The village centre consists of 
a square surrounded by a mosque, café 
and hairdresser’s and is ornamented 
with a fountain which was donated by 
family members working in Germany, 
as was the minaret of the mosque. The 
courtyards are mostly bordered by a one 
or two-room house where tobacco is 
sometimes stored during harvest time. 
The surrounding walls incorporate the 
courtyard into the living area, especially 
in summer, whether it is where house-
work is done, children play or the fam-
ily sleep on particularly hot nights. In 
terms of character, Dymi thus resembles 
many older villages in Western Anatolia 
(HöhfelD 1991, p. 32). The school, café 
for young people and single homesteads 
belonging to more wealthy farmers are 
outside the old centre of the village.
In terms of population structure, 
Dymi is a classic example of a yaka com-
munity. According to its own censuses, 
the village had 394 inhabitants in 1994, 
which represents an absolute increase in 
population of just 17(!) inhabitants since 
1920 (AyDinli 1971, p. 343) and indicates 
the high rate of outward migration from 
Thrace since the mid-1960s. Neverthe-
less, the generative behaviour has more 
similarities with developments in tra-
ditional farming societies in Anatolia 
(WittWer-backofen 1987) than with a 
state on the southern periphery of Eu-
rope. Most men marry between the ages 
of 20 and 24 years and women between 
14 and 19 years. Only very few – gener-
ally young men and women with gram-
mar school qualifications or university 
degrees – said they wanted to marry late 
(>24 years) or not at all. The difference 
in age at which women marry and have 
their first child is also characteristic. Al-
most 60 % of women give birth to their 
first child one to two years after getting 
married. Of these, around 40 % give 
birth in the first year after marriage.
Dymi is also a textbook yaka com-
munity in terms of its economy. The pre-
dominance of cherry orchards right near 
the village is noticeable (particularly 
during the flowering season), while to-
bacco fields shape the farming land one 
kilometre away. The village livestock, 
particularly sheep, is kept in the moun-
tains in summer and let out in the har-
vested fields in winter. The traditional 
way of life is reflected in the farming. 
The main product grown in the yaka is 
tobacco, which takes up the majority of 
the 400 dönum (around 400 ha) that con-
stitute the village’s arable land. Although 
the cultivation of tobacco may safeguard 
a family income “as nothing else can” – 
in relation to the small farm sizes (75 % 
between 2-15 ha) (Lienau 1989, p. 144) 
– oriental tobacco growing is time-
consuming and labour-intensive. The 
whole process of planting and cultivating 
(growing in cold frames, frequent irriga-
tion, bedding out, frequent cleaning of 
the fields, transplanting the flowers and 
labour-intensive sorting procedures) is 
in family “hands” in both senses of the 
word. Tractors are barely used on small-
er areas of land. Even in 1995, almost 
every third household used mules, don-
keys or horses as working animals. It is 
debatable how long tobacco farming can 
continue there, in spite of EU subsidies 
and a changeover to more robust hybrids 
and first-class Virginia tobacco (Diyalog 
6/2/1998, pp. 3-4), in light of the declin-
ing demand, anti-smoking campaigns in 
many European countries and the associ-
ated drop in prices.
Only few big farmers risk modernis-
ing their businesses because profession-
al diversification is more pronounced 
among the under-40s and a large number 
of them were or are employed in far-off 
regions of Greece, Turkey or Western 
Europe (Fig. 4).
Traditional patterns determine life in 
the village as well as the farming. The 
topics under discussion in the café are 
not just concerned with day-to-day busi-
ness, but also with moral issues, while 
the speakers consume tea or juice – not 
alcohol. The contact person there is the 
imam who has a leading role as mediator 
and teacher.
The view of Turkey is particular in-
teresting owing to the numerous connec-
tions between the village’s inhabitants 
and family members working and study-
ing in Turkey.
The people feel close to Turkey and 
are interested in Turkish domestic poli-
tics and sporting events. Their solidarity 
with Turkish policy is always conspicu-
ous, even in cases of hotly disputed ac-
tions, as in the case with the Kurds. And 
whenever tensions arise with Greece, the 
people tend to agree with Ankara’s posi-
tion. In sports, their “natural” affinity to 
Turkey becomes particularly apparent. A 
study shows that even school pupils tend 
to favour Turkish culture and Turkey. 
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The Turkish national basketball team 
is more popular (45 %) than the Greek 
team (36 %). The inhabitants of Dymi 
support Galatasaray or Beşiktaş Istan-
bul, or sport the colours of Trabzonspor. 
This solidarity in the fan cult area is 
particularly significant since the attitude 
towards Greece practically takes a back-
seat. These demonstrations of sympathy 
are often regarded as irredentism by the 
Christians. But hardly anyone is demand-
ing annexation to Turkey, if only because 
they enjoy all of the EU rights, unlike the 
Turkish EU citizens in Turkey.
The collective identity of the yaka 
inhabitants comes across in particular 
whenever the government takes meas-
ures that may be seen as arbitrary to-
wards the “Turks”, such as the seizure of 
land belonging to yaka farmers to build 
a university campus near Komotini in 
1978, of which a third has been built at 
most.
The case of a small church between 
Dymi and Folea – in the middle of the 
yaka in Muslim territory – shows how 
deeply rooted the awareness of a congru-
ence between area and population group 
is in Thracian society. Its construction is 
seen as a deliberate religious provocation 
against the Turkish Muslim sovereignty 
in the area (Ileri 12/12/1997, p. 2), even 
though many Christians by no means re-
gard the chapel as a place of pilgrimage 
and the Metropolitan Bishop of Komoti-
ni saw its building as “a thrust against 
Islam“.
Pagouria
The spaciously laid out colonist village of 
Pagouria is situated in the foreland (orta 
kışla) and is a clear contrast to Dymi (see 
Fig. 3). It was built in the early 1930s on 
the boundary of an existing Bulgarian 
Muslim village. The plural ending “-a” 
indicates the original dual-centred struc-
ture of the village, although the part with 
traditional buildings now only makes up 
one quarter of the whole village since the 
Muslims have either left the village or 
have moved into larger modern houses 
themselves. In the 1990s, the village was 
extended with new buildings for refugees 
from the Caucasus (Fig. 5). Although 
there were still a few pastures left in 
1998 between the village and the River 
Vosvozis (Fig. 5) – relics of the former 
semi-nomadic economy – the driving 
force of agriculture is cotton, the symbol 
of the orta kışla, which is reflected in the 
appearance of the village with its spa-
cious machinery stores and wide streets 
for the outsize cotton harvesters.
The situation of the Christian areas in 
the higher part of the village, dominated 
by the church and the water tower, sym-
bolises the – on average – economic and 
social supremacy of the Christian popu-
lation. The Greek colonisation helped to 
create a clear Christian hegemony, which 
is expressed in the number of homesteads 
(1996: 41 Christian, 20 Muslim) as well 
as in the share of agricultural land (Fig. 
6).
In their everyday working lives and 
private lives, the villagers talk to each 
other, help each other and share joy and 
hardships. They attend village festivals 
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Source: own design
84 Europa Regional 15(2007)2
together, pay their respects to the others 
on religious festive days or on the occa-
sion of bereavements and drink ouzo or 
rakı together – alcohol is not taboo in 
the cafés. On the other hand, both the 
Imam and the Pope complained jointly 
about low attendance at services and 
the farmers complained jointly about 
the new EU directives. These findings 
aim to show that daily life can be shared 
together. The fact that explosive topics 
on Greco-Turkish relations can be heat-
edly debated yesterday and today with-
out causing long-term quarrels shows 
that this mixed-religion community has 
developed mechanisms over the dec-
ades enabling them to live together. And 
cases such as the Imia-Kardak dispute in 
1995, when Greek and Turkish warships 
surrounded the islets in the Aegean and 
the villagers soon said that the “ships 
were just cruising around”, prove that 
they have long-standing experience of 
the others, which outsiders do not share. 
The people live together according to the 
motto: “In the village community, eve-
ryone has enemies among Muslims and 
Christians alike” (kanDler 2007, p. 81).
Language is not an obstacle to daily 
communication. Most of the Muslims 
living in Thrace can speak at least a few 
words of Greek and the Turkish language 
is not foreign to older Greeks, in particu-
lar, who grew up side by side with Mus-
lims or who came into contact with it in 
their homes in Asia Minor.  Thus, Pagou-
ria, as other mixed-religion settlements, 
makes an ideal field of investigation for 
linguists researching language develop-
ment and language interference between 
Turkish and Greek as representatives of 
different language families. In conversa-
tions between native Greek and Turkish 
speakers, words from the other language 
quickly slip in and are understood. I was 
also able to observe that speakers do not 
just take over single words – often un-
intentionally – but that syntactic shifts 
occur during speech. Turkish sentences 
are not infrequently formed with Indo-
European word order.
But it has to be remembered that the 
Turkish language is surviving in an en-
vironment shaped by Greek culture and 
does not share the fate of languages of 
purely cultural minorities which, in 
some cases, practically have the status of 
an old custom (such as Upper and Lower 
Sorbish in the German state of Saxony). 
Turkish is the language of everyday use 
and is struggling for official recognition. 
This survival has several reasons:
Since the 1950s, in particular, when 
Greece started holding the Muslim mi-
nority – as Turkish charges – partly re-
sponsible for the expulsion of Greeks 
from Turkey and later even controlled 
and oppressed them as fifth column-
ists of the arch enemy, the forced situa-
tion has strengthened the bond between 
the minority and their mother country 
(“anavatan” in Turkish). Since Turkish 
was propagated as a national-ethnic con-
figuration characteristic during the era of 
Sadık Ahmet in the 1980s, it has gained 
an important function as an identity-
giver – supported by the regional media 
(newspapers and later radio stations) 
– which was to overcome ethnic differ-
ences between Pomaks, Athinganoi and 
Osmanlıs. It is therefore understandable 
that attempts in the 1990s on the part of 
Greek organisations to make Pomak – a 
language without a fixed writing system 
– a basis of identity for the Pomaks to re-
lease them from the Turkish association 
met with only little success.
The bilaterally negotiated education 
protocols permitted the use of Turkish 
literature. Although it may have been 
unsuitable from a teaching point of view, 
it nonetheless imparted the Turkish lan-
guage standards from Turkey.
The emphasis on the Turkish lan-
guage and the limited options available 
for non-native speakers to learn Greek 
meant that only few pupils were able to 
learn Greek to a standard that allowed 
them to go on to further education and 
professional careers in Greece. The con-
sequence of this was that young people 
went on to further education in Turkey 
or even found jobs and homes there, after 
completing their final year of school at 
the latest. Some of these citizens ran the 
risk of losing their nationality in accord-
ance with Article 19. These educational 
difficulties have resulted in a curious 
situation, which is not that uncommon, 
whereby Muslims from Greek Thrace 
living and working in Germany as Greek 
nationals can speak German and Turk-
ish, but not a single word of Greek.
Many women lack sufficient knowl-
edge of Greek. A random test in a mixed-
religion quarter of Komotini showed that 
only 41.3 % of Muslim women under-
stood Greek (1996: 70.8 % of Christian 
women understood Turkish). This is 
partly because many parents tradition-
ally gave priority to their male children 
when it came to education. Older wom-
en, in particular (1996: >40), but also 
men, did not have to worry about go-
ing about their daily business in public 
(shopping, school, visiting authorities) 
since the service providers either spoke 
Turkish or employed staff with Turkish 
language skills.
This means that Thrace is truly bilin-
gual.
While the process of convergence is 
still underway at an official level, the 
way in which people interact on a private 
level shows far more experience. A few 
indications are listed here in brief:
The appearance of Muslim women 
in mixed-religion communities, particu-
larly younger women, has more similari-
ties with that of Christian women than in 
mono-religious communities.
Religious activities in public places 
enjoy mutual respect and are celebrated 
together on occasion (funeral services, 
presents and congratulations on the oth-
ers’ festive days). Muslim school pupils 
and folklore groups even take part in the 
festivities on 25 March, the anniversary 
of Greek independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. And the funeral service of Sadık 
Ahmet in 1996 was followed closely by 
the fairly Islam-critical Greek-speaking 
local press – not out of spitefulness or 
journalistic voyeurism, but out of genu-
ine sympathy (kanDler 2007, p. 95).
The attempt at assigning religious 
phenomena in Christianity and Islam 
Fig. 6: Pagouria – percentage of agricultur-
al land owned by to Christians and Muslims 
by size of farm
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to shared roots is interesting. Easter 
(slaughter of the lamb) is comparable to 
the Festival of Sacrifice, kurban bayramı, 
for instance.
On a business level, communication 
between Muslims and Christians is a 
matter of course. Many shops welcome 
their customers in their native language. 
Competition and partnership do not 
keep to religious boundaries. However, 
religious principles do form invisible 
boundaries, which are observed very 
closely by both sides. There are hardly 
any interfaith marriages. There are ap-
parently some interfaith couples, but 
they no longer live in Thrace owing to 
the strict moral code there.
The two-class status is persisting the 
longest at a political level. A local Muslim 
politician said: “Among 50,000 Chris-
tians I have only ten serious enemies. But 
at a political level, we are second-class 
citizens” (KanDler 2007, p. 97). Since 
2006, Ilhan Ahmet, a Thracian Muslim, 
has been a member of the Greek parlia-
ment, Ahmet Hacıosman is Vice-Prefect 
of Rhodope (ABTTF 25/11/2006) and 
Gülbeyaz Karahasan was the first Thra-
cian Muslim woman to run for the office 
of Prefect for the Xanthi-Kavala-Drama 
region.
Conclusion
The aim was to show that a settlement 
area, which is lived in by communi-
ties from different ethnic, cultural and 
religious backgrounds, is perceived 
and claimed as home by both in equal 
measures. This situation, as found in 
Greek Thrace, cannot be explained us-
ing the common conception of integra-
tion (or assimilation), which is explic-
itly acknowledged as being a “dynamic, 
lengthy and … differentiated process of 
growing together” (hillmann 1994, p. 
56), but which implicitly assumes that 
a society is expanded with new groups. 
Taking this definition, integration cannot 
be achieved in Thrace in the foreseeable 
future. Integration in the Western Euro-
pean sense is not wanted. Christians and 
Muslims are not yet treated as equals. 
But despite this, both groups see Thrace 
as their homeland, unlike some immi-
grant societies in Western Europe.
Unlike in Western and Central Eu-
rope, the goal in Thrace must be to build 
trust by putting an end to the subliminal 
classification into “same origin” (omog-
enis) and “foreign origin” (allogenis) – 
in this case Greek and Turkish – in the 
minds of the Greek population and to put 
this into practise in everyday dealings 
with the minority. There is hope that the 
irritations, which are still the order of the 
day, such as the curtailing of Turkish ra-
dio stations by a new Greek media law 
(ABTTF 3/8/2007), will at some point be 
seen in a more relaxed way.
The current situation, as presented 
in brief, raises the hope that Christians 
and Muslims will continue to grow to-
gether. The Greek authorities appear to 
have recognised the importance of this. 
Karamanlis, Greek Prime Minister since 
2004, said that the government has set 
the improvement of minority settlement 
areas in Western Thrace as a goal be-
cause of the region’s future alone, and 
that “Muslims have to share in national 
developments …” (ABTTF 29/9/2007).
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